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Abstract 
The present article purports to shed a new light on ordoliberalism and to explore its role in EU 
Competition Law. For this purpose, the article analyses the ordoliberal school of thought in its historical 
context and re-conceptualizes its understanding of competition law that has been subjected to numerous 
misrepresentations in the existing literature. The main argument presented here is that the ordoliberals 
perceived a direct link between competition and democracy as the normative underpinning of 
competition law. This competition-democracy nexus rests upon the assumption of interdependence 
between the economic, social and political order and argues that both consequentialist and deontological 
values legitimize competition law and should guide its interpretation. Thus, competition should be 
protected as such, since it sets the boundaries of economic power and creates the preconditions for 
economic freedom and equality of opportunity. In this sense, competition law seeks to ensure that the 
functioning of the market does not undermine and is conducive to a democratic society. Further, we 
claim that the nexus idea could provide us with a better understanding of EU Competition Law than a 
fully-fledged welfarist approach. In particular, the nexus idea could be traced in the field of Art. 101 
and Art. 102 TFEU in the CJEU’s deontological understanding of competition (i); the Court’s balancing 
between procedural and consequentialist goals (ii), and in the Court’s form-based approach (iii) that is 
responsive to input from economics (iv).  
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  1 
Introduction*
More than thirty years after the publication of Robert Bork’s ground-breaking book in 1978,1 EU 
Competition Law is currently facing its own ‘antitrust paradox’. In particular, even though the consumer 
welfare objective has found numerous advocates amongst competition law scholars, practitioners and 
enforcers also on this side of the Atlantic,2 the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’ or ‘the 
Court’) 3 continues to be reluctant to follow a strict welfarist approach.4 The scholarly literature tends to 
attribute this apparent paradox to the allegedly on-going influence of ordoliberalism on EU Competition 
Law and the Court’s reasoning.5 Accordingly, numerous decisions of the CJEU have been considered 
as setting unsatisfactory law due to their ordoliberal origin. In general, ordoliberalism has been criticized 
as an unworkable, inefficient and formalistic paradigm that prevents EU Competition Law from being 
fully efficient.6 Hence, abandoning the ordoliberal concepts and fully endorsing a welfarist approach is 
perceived by the advocates of a ‘more economic approach’ as a necessary step for developing a better 
understanding of the subject matter of EU Competition Law, enhancing its legitimacy and informing its 
legal hermeneutics. 
Arguably, ordoliberal thinking has played an important role in the development and the application of 
European competition rules.7 However, it remains unclear what the core conceptual elements of this 
                                                     
* This article has been previously published under the following title: Elias Deutscher and Stavros Makris ‘Exploring the 
Ordoliberal Paradigm: The Competition-Democracy Nexus’ (2016) 11 (2) Competition Law Review, 181-214. The article 
largely benefited from the comments of the participants in the CLasF Conference in Lancaster in April 2015, as well as 
from the thoughtful suggestions of professors Peter Behrens, Petros Mavroidis, Giorgio Monti and Nicki Hargreaves. All 
errors and omissions remain our own. 
1 Robert H Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with itself [1978] (Maxwell Macmillan 1993). 
2 Neelie Kroes, ‘European Competition Policy – Delivering Better Markets and Better Choice’ (SPEECH/05/512, 15 September 
2005) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-05-512_en.htm accessed 23 March 2016. Guidance on the 
Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant 
undertakings, OJ C 45, 24.2.2009, p. 7–20. para. 5. 
3 The ‘EU Courts’ comprise the Court of Justice (‘CoJ’) and the General Court (‘GC’) and collectively make up the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’). 
4 The welfarist approach has many different formulations, yet its main topos is that the value of any institution derives from its 
welfare maximization properties. Thus, ‘efficiency is the ultimate goal of antitrust, and competition is a mediate goal that 
will often be close enough to the ultimate goal to allow the courts go no further’. See Richard A Posner, Antitrust Law 
(University of Chicago Press 2001) 29. Further, efficiency could be defined as maximizing total or consumer welfare. For 
a definition of consumer welfare see Robert O'Donoghue and A. J Padilla, The law and economics of Article 82 EC (Hart 
Publishing 2006) 4. However, assessing what is the most workable conception of efficiency is beyond the scope of this 
study. In this respect, we use the terms efficiency and welfare-maximization as interchangeable. There are numerous 
welfarist approaches and some of them incorporate elements of ordoliberal thinking. Here we use the term in a schematic 
way as a device allowing us to clarify the main features of the ordoliberal approach 
5 See for instance A. J Padilla and Christian Ahlborn, ‘From Fairness to Welfare: Implications for the Assessment of Unilateral 
Conduct under EC Competition Law’ in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel Marquis (eds), European Competition Law 
Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to Article 82 EC (Hart 2008). Philip Marsden, ‘Some outstanding issues from the 
European Commission's Guidance on Article 102: Not-so-faint echoes of Ordoliberalism’ in Federico Etro and Ioannis 
Kokkoris (eds), Competition Law and the Enforcement of Article 102 (Oxford University Press, USA 2010); Patrick Rey 
and James S Venit, ‘An Effects-Based Approach to Article 102: A Response to Wouter Wils’ (2015) 38(1) World 
Competition 3; Christian Ahlborn and David S Evans, ‘The Microsoft Judgment and its Implications for Competition Policy 
towards Dominant Firms in Europe’ (2009) 75(3) Antiturst Law Journal. 
6 Pinar Akman, ‘Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82 EC’ (CCP Working Paper, University of East Anglia 2007) 3; 
Padilla and Ahlborn (n 5); Rey and Venit (n 5). 
7 David J Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the "New" Europe’ (1994) 
42(25) American Journal of Comparative Law 25; David J Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: 
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school of thought are and to what extent it has affected the application of the law. In fact, the label 
‘ordoliberalism’ has been adopted as an easy explanatory factor for the legal development of EU 
Competition Law without being further analysed.8 Currently, it is simply used as the synonym for out-
dated legal formalism or weak economic reasoning and as an epithet for everything that does not 
correspond to the more economic approach.9 Nonetheless, the contemporary academic debate does not 
fully answer a quite intuitive question: How is it that this anachronistic paradigm, developed more than 
half a century ago10 in the peripheral German university-town of Freiburg and with a tendency to 
produce poor results, still affects EU Competition Law?11  
This paper intends to shed new light on ordoliberalism and provide a new angle to the debate. In 
particular, it aims to clarify the conceptual foundations of ordoliberalism and explore their linkages with 
the existing case law. The main argument presented here is that ordoliberalism still influences EU 
Competition Law in particular by virtue of its idea of a competition-democracy nexus. This concept of 
a direct link between competition and democracy, which is deeply entrenched in EU Competition Law, 
rests upon the assumption of interdependence between the economic, social and political order.12 
Ordoliberalism implies that the form of the economic order does not only bear economic consequences, 
but also affects the social and political sphere. Thus, competition rules aim to prevent distortions that 
could undermine the competitive process to the detriment of the public interest. We contend that this 
ordoliberal idea offers a solid basis for understanding European competition rules and strengthening 
their legitimacy, for it can explain the law as it currently stands and orientate its interpretation.  
The argument is developed in three steps. First, we briefly provide a theoretical definition of the notions 
of democracy and the competition-democracy nexus (I). Secondly, we analyse the different dimensions 
of the competition democracy nexus in their historical context (II). This nexus, the argument goes, 
constitutes the underlying rationale of the ordoliberal understanding of competition and its law. The 
third part explores how the ordoliberal nexus influences the application of Articles 101 and 102 of Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) (III). This analysis seeks to illustrate in what sense 
                                                     
Protecting Prometheus (Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press 1998); Kiran K Patel and Heike Schweitzer (eds), The 
Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law ; Peter Behrens, ‘The Ordoliberal Concept of "Abuse" of a Dominant 
Position and its Impact on Article 102 TFEU’ (Discussion Paper N°7/15, Europa-Kolleg Hamburg 2015) 33; Heike 
Schweitzer, ‘The History, Interpretation and Underlying Principles of Section 2 Sherman Act and Article 82 EC’ in Claus-
Dieter Ehlermann and Mel Marquis (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to Article 82 
EC (Hart 2008) 128–138. For a different point of view see Akman (n 6); Pinar Akman and Hussein Kassim, ‘Myths and 
Myth-Making in the European Union: The Institutionalization and Interpretation of EU Competition Policy*’ (2010) 48(1) 
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 111; Pınar Akman, ‘The Role of ‘Freedom’ in EU Competition Law’ (2014) 
34(2) Leg Stud (Soc Leg Scholars) 183. For a critical review of Gerber’s and Akman’s account of ordoliberalism and its 
impact on the drafting of EU competition rules see Behrens, ‘The Ordoliberal Concept of "Abuse" of a Dominant Position 
and its Impact on Article 102 TFEU’ (n 7).  
8 As observed for instance by Mel Marquis, ‘Introduction, Summary, Remarks’ in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel Marquis 
(eds), European Competition Law Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to Article 82 EC (Hart 2008) xxxi, fn. 16.  
9 Rey and Venit (n 5), 23. 
10 See as ‘founding-text’ of the Ordoliberal paradigm or the so-called Freiburger Schule: Franz Böhm, Walter Eucken and 
Hans Großmann-Doerth, ‘Unsere Aufgabe (The Ordoliberal Manifesto) - 1936’ in Nils Goldschmidt (ed), Grundtexte zur 
Freiburger Tradition der Ordnungsökonomik (Mohr Siebeck 2008). 
11 Arguably, the influence of ordoliberalism is not confined to EU Competition Law, but currently also orientates the EU’s 
economic and monetary policy. See in this sense The Economist, ‘Germany and Economics - Of Rules and Order - German 
Ordoliberalism Has Had a Big Influence on Policy During The Euro Crisis’ (9 May 2015); Francois Denord, Rachel 
Knaebel and Pierre Rimbert, ‘L'Ordolibéralisme Allemand, Cage de Fer pour le Vieux Continent’ Le Monde Diplomatique 
(1 August 2015). This aspect of ordoliberalism, however, goes beyond the scope of this inquiry and according to the authors 
is not necessarily related to the ordoliberal paradigm in EU Competition Law. 
12 Walter Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (Mohr Siebeck 2004) 16, 304-308; Frank Maier-Rigaud, ‘On the 
Normative Foundations of Competition Law - Efficiency, Political Freedom and the Freedom to Compete’ in Daniel 
Zimmer (ed), The Goals of Competition Law (Elgar 2012) 137. 
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the ordoliberal paradigm explains the law as it is and how it guides its interpretation. Moreover, it aims 
to demonstrate that the ordoliberal conception of the competition-democracy nexus allows for an 
economically informed categorical thinking. In this regard, ordoliberal thinking could guide and delimit 
the more economic approach by proposing a framework capable of accommodating the concept of 
efficiency and attributing to it its due value. This may explain the Court’s continuous reluctance to adopt 
a purely welfare-oriented reasoning in competition cases. 
Setting the scene 
Anyone opening nowadays an antitrust textbook, will probably soon discover that consumer welfare 
constitutes, according to the predominant view, the central goal of EU Competition Law.13 From this 
perspective, the claim that there is a link between competition (law) and democracy seems to be rather 
counterintuitive. However, the European Competition Law paradox described above shows that the so-
called more economic approach fails to fully explain the normative underpinnings and the application 
of EU Competition Law. In other words, there is an important contradiction between the precepts of the 
dominant theory of antitrust and the practice of EU Competition Law. While the more economic 
approach criticizes the divergence of EU Competition Law from the normative goal of welfare 
maximization and pushes for legal reform, our account of the ordoliberal paradigm offers a different 
angle.  
The concept of a ‘competition-democracy’ nexus, we argue, provides an alternative framework for 
analyzing and explaining EU Competition Law. This framework offers a more complete and coherent 
account and normative basis for EU Competition Law than the more economic approach. The key point 
of the argument put forward in this paper is that the democratic legitimacy of competition law relies on 
a combination of what Fritz Scharpf calls ‘input-oriented legitimacy’ and ‘output-oriented legitimacy’.14 
These two categories mirror two dimensions of democratic self-government and show how different 
principles, goals and institutional rules contribute to the democratic legitimacy of an institution.15 In 
addition, these two categories comprise a way of conceptualizing competition law that is reflected in the 
Court’s reasoning. 
The input-oriented legitimacy of a democratic system refers to what Abraham Lincoln called 
‘government by the people’.16 It is based on certain institutional rules ensuring the democratic decision-
making as self-determination of the citizens. Thus, input-oriented legitimacy refers to democracy as 
participation and expression of the general will of the citizens.17 It also relies on the procedural 
safeguards of the democratic process, which ensure equality of opportunity, individual freedom, 
autonomy and the fundamental rights of the constituents.  
Conversely, the category of output-oriented legitimacy refers to what Lincoln described as ‘government 
for the people’.18 This form of democratic legitimacy is based on institutional rules, which enable a 
political system to achieve consequentialist goals in the general interest, while respecting certain limits 
                                                     
13 O'Donoghue and Padilla (n 4) 4; Simon Bishop and Mike Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, 
Application and Measurement (Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 30; Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition law (Oxford 
University Press 2012) 19; Kroes (n 2). 
14 Fritz W Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford University Press 1999) 2. 
15 We use the term institution in the sense of Douglas North: “Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in 
human exchange, whether political, social, or economic.” Douglas C North, Institutions, Institutional Change and 
Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press 1990) 3. 
16 Scharpf (n 14) 2. 
17 ibid 8 ft. 2; 10f. 
18 ibid 2. 
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of political power.19 Such limits constitute in turn the precondition of input-legitimacy, for they prevent 
deontological values, which constitute the very basis of the democratic process, from being sacrificed 
in the pursuit of a consequentialist goal. Thus, output-oriented legitimacy is related to consequentialism 
and suggests that an institution or a polity is justified as long as it achieves the greatest net satisfaction 
summed over all the individuals subjected to it.20 Nonetheless, output-oriented legitimacy should also 
take into consideration the Lockean idea of the ‘boundaries of power’.21 This implies that the quest for 
achieving ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest number’22 is constrained by the boundaries set by the 
input-oriented legitimacy. Thus, every institution or polity must strike a balance between the 
achievement of outcome-oriented goals and the protection of deontological goals, so as to ensure its 
democratic legitimacy.  
These two categories of input- and output-oriented legitimacy allow us to operationalize the ordoliberal 
conception of the competition-democracy nexus. First, by applying the concept of input- and output-
oriented legitimacy to competition, we argue that competition constitutes an institution, which relies on 
different forms of democratic legitimacy. Secondly, we contend that the nexus concept sets forth criteria 
indicating how a certain institutional form of competition contributes to the legitimacy of a democratic 
political system.  
The Ordoliberal conception of the competition-democracy nexus 
The ordoliberal nexus between competition and democracy can have two dimensions.23 First, this 
relationship can be negative, implying that the distortions of competition might have a serious impact 
on a democratic polity and vice versa. Secondly, this relationship can also take the form of a positive 
link where competition is conducive to a democratic polity and vice versa. 
The negative dimension 
In the first place, the ordoliberals formulated the competition-democracy nexus in a negative way. In 
light of the historical experience of the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich in Germany, they believed 
that the elimination of competition could undermine democracy in the political sphere and facilitate the 
rise of totalitarianism.24 This negative link drew on the experience of the cartelisation and 
monopolisation of the German economy since the 1870s.25 During the Weimar Republic, the 
incapability of laissez-faire liberalism to control the concentration of private economic power entailed 
the destruction of competition and undermined the social and political preconditions of democracy. 
                                                     
19 ibid 13. 
20 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice [1971]: Revised Edition (Harvard University Press 2003) 22. 
21 John Locke, The second treatise of government [1689] (Reclam 2012) Chapter XI, § 135, p. 218. 
22 James H Burns and Hart, Herbert L. A (eds), The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham: A Comment on the Commentaries 
and A Fragment on Government (Clarendon Press 1977) 393. 
23 We agree with Prof. Behren’s reservations against associating ordoliberalism exclusively with the Freiburg School and 
partially share his view that ordoliberalism is a dynamic and diverse school of thought, rather than a monolithic paradigm. 
See Behrens, ‘The Ordoliberal Concept of "Abuse" of a Dominant Position and its Impact on Article 102 TFEU’ (n 7) 12. 
The idea of a ‘competition-democracy’ nexus has, however, initially been coined by the members of the Freiburg School 
and also constitutes the normative DNA of the understanding of competition law of second and third generation of 
ordoliberals. 
24 Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the "New" Europe’ (n 7) 28. 
Michel Foucault, Naissance de la Biopolitique: Cours au Collège de France, 1978-1979 (Gallimard; Seuil 2004) 80. 
25 Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, ‘The Development of German and European Competition Law with Special Reference to the 
EU Commission's Article 82 Guidance of 2008’ in Lorenzo F Pace (ed), European Competition Law: The Impact of the 
Commission's Guidance on Article 102 (Edward Elgar 2011) 34–36. 
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According to the ordoliberal account, the weak Weimarian state failed inter alia because it allowed the 
private market participants to decide on the ‘rules of the game’. As a result, various private actors were 
able to exercise coercion on others by restricting their rights and freedoms and unduly exclude them 
from the market.26 Consequently, market participants could not freely participate in the market on equal 
terms, while powerful actors could effectively violate other citizens’ economic rights, freedoms and 
opportunities. This excessive concentration and abuse of private economic power impaired competition 
and undermined the input-oriented legitimacy of the market process. For this reason, ordoliberals 
concluded that laissez-faire capitalism is inherently unstable27 and that competition law should prevent 
economic freedom from destroying its own prerequisites.28 
In parallel, powerful market players were able to convert their economic into political power and corrupt 
via interest capture various political institutions. Hence, the cartelisation and monopolisation of the 
German Economy also entailed, according to the ordoliberals, important social and political 
consequences, for it led to economic, social and political ‘group anarchy’ (Gruppenanarchie) between 
powerful interest groups.29 These economic phenomena transformed the Weimarian economic and 
political system into a ‘neo-feudal’ system, undermining the independence of the state, as well as the 
supporting social structures of democracy.30 Therefore, the concentration of market power did not only 
jeopardize the competitive process, but also harmed the input-oriented legitimacy of the political system 
by curtailing the procedural guarantees of equal participation in the political game. Such development 
also had significant ramifications on the political rights of the citizens.31  
In the same vein, the ordoliberals contended that laissez-faire liberalism enabled the rise of the centrally 
planned economy associated with the Nazi Regime.32 In their eyes, the increasing economic 
concentration and the subsequent hostility to competition led to a deep crisis of the German economy 
that undermined the legitimacy of the existing economic and political order. This raised popular demand 
for an intrusive role of the state in the economy and for strong political leadership. As a consequence, 
an increasing number of private cartels and monopolies was brought under the control of the state or 
was directly socialized.33 Yet, instead of solving the problem of excessive concentration of market 
power, these measures entailed the coalition between private and public economic power that paved the 
                                                     
26 Heike Knortz, Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Weimarer Republik: Eine Einführung in Ökonomie und Gesellschaft der ersten 
Deutschen Republik (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2010) 32, 81; Walter Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (Mohr 
Siebeck 2004) 53–55. 
27 In this respect, the ordoliberals are much closer to classical liberalism than modern libertarians or proponents of laissez-faire 
capitalism, since the portrayal of classical liberals as extreme opponents of government intervention is fundamentally 
misguided. See Lanny Ebenstein, Chicagonomics: The Evolution of Free Market Economics (St. Martin's Press 2015) 1–
18. 
28 Wernhardt Möschel, ‘Competition Policy from an Ordo Point of View’ in Alan T Peacock, Hans Willgerodt and Daniel 
Johnson (eds), German neo-liberals and the social market economy (Macmillan for the Trade Policy Research Centre 1989) 
149. 
29 Franz Böhm, Freiheit und Ordnung in der Marktwirtschaft [1971] (Nomos 1980) 68. 
30 Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (n 26) 326–330. Franz Böhm, ‘Democracy and Economic Power in Cartel and 
Monopoly in Modern Law [1961]’ in Daniel A Crane and Herbert Hovenkamp (eds), The making of competition policy: 
Legal and economic sources (Oxford University Press 2013) 273. Knortz (n 26) 193. 
31 Böhm, Freiheit und Ordnung in der Marktwirtschaft [1971] (n 29) 68. 
32 Leonhard Miksch, ‘Versuch eines liberalen Programms [1949]’ in Nils Goldschmidt (ed), Grundtexte zur Freiburger 
Tradition der Ordnungsökonomik (Mohr Siebeck 2008) 165; Leonhard Miksch, Wettbewerb als Aufgabe - Grundsätze 
einer Wettbewerbsordnung (Verlag Helmut Küpper 1947) 212–217; Foucault (n 24) 110–113. 
33 Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (n 26) 334; Mestmäcker, ‘The Development of German and European 
Competition Law with Special Reference to the EU Commission's Article 82 Guidance of 2008’ (n 25) 36. 
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way for the establishment of a centrally planned economy.34 At the same time, the state relied heavily 
on cartels and monopolies as transmission belts for the implementation of its central economic 
planning.35 Simultaneously, mighty economic groups continuously wielded their economic power in the 
political sphere36 and reaped benefits from their support for the rising Nazi regime.37  
To put it succinctly, the Nazi regime used a consequentialist discourse so as to reduce the institutional 
checks-and-balances that limited economic and political power. As a result, the rule of law was 
undermined and citizens were deprived of their political and economic freedoms.38 These factors 
enabled the emergence of powerful private actors that supported the rise of a totalitarian regime. 39 The 
excessive concentration of economic power reinforced and was reinforced by the excessive 
concentration of political power in the hands of the State.  
The positive dimension 
It is, however, important to notice, that the Freiburg School did not limit itself only to the formulation 
of the abovementioned negative link. On the contrary, the ordoliberals tried to find out how competition 
as a specific institutional form of the market was compatible with and conducive to democracy.40 
Contrary to the image conveyed by the scholarly literature, ordoliberalism does not provide an obsolete 
‘doomsday theory’.41 What it does do is establish a positive relationship between competition and 
democracy. This positive link epitomises in the three ordoliberal goals of competition, namely welfare-
maximisation, economic freedom and procedural justice, which positively contribute to the legitimacy 
of competition itself as well as of the democratic polity. 
Surprisingly, and contrary to the common critique that ordoliberals were incapable of taking into account 
economic knowledge and accommodating efficiency considerations,42 this positive link also rests upon 
the goal of welfare maximisation. Indeed, the examination of ordoliberal thinkers’ original texts reveals 
                                                     
34 Walter Eucken, ‘Das Problem der wirtschaftlichen Macht’ in Walter Eucken and Walter Oswalt (eds), Wirtschaftsmacht und 
Wirtschaftsordnung: Londoner Vorträge zur Wirtschaftspolitik und zwei Beiträge zur Antimonopolpolitik (Lit 2001) 16–
18. Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (n 26) 293. 
35 Mestmäcker, ‘The Development of German and European Competition Law with Special Reference to the EU Commission's 
Article 82 Guidance of 2008’ (n 25) 37; Miksch, Wettbewerb als Aufgabe - Grundsätze einer Wettbewerbsordnung (n 32) 
213. 
36 Walter Eucken and T. W Hutchison, ‘On the Theory of the Centrally Administered Economy: An Analysis of the German 
Experiment. Part II’ (1948) 15(59) Economica 173, 182. Miksch, Wettbewerb als Aufgabe - Grundsätze einer 
Wettbewerbsordnung (n 32) 213. The support of the rising NSDAP and its economic governance by powerful German 
industrialists and cartels is also discussed by historical research. David Abraham, The Collapse of the Weimar Republic: 
Political Economy and Crisis (Holmes & Meier 1986) 317–324. Adam Tooze, ‘The German National Economy in an Era 
of Crisis and War, 1917-1945’ in Helmut W Smith (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Modern German History (Oxford 
University Press 2011) 411.  
37 Giuliano Amato, Antitrust and the Bounds of Power: The Dilemma of Liberal Democracy in the History of the Market (Hart 
Publishing 1997) 40. 
38 Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (n 26) 309, 332-334. Böhm, Freiheit und Ordnung in der Marktwirtschaft [1971] 
(n 29) 82. 
39 Walter Eucken and Walter Oswalt (eds), Wirtschaftsmacht und Wirtschaftsordnung: Londoner Vorträge zur 
Wirtschaftspolitik und zwei Beiträge zur Antimonopolpolitik (Lit 2001) 19–20. Böhm, Freiheit und Ordnung in der 
Marktwirtschaft [1971] (n 29) 83; Walter Eucken, ‘Staatliche Strukturwandlungen und die Krisis des Kapitalismus’ (1932) 
36 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 297, 298-300; 308; Böhm, Freiheit und Ordnung in der Marktwirtschaft [1971] (n 29) 83. 
40 Böhm, Freiheit und Ordnung in der Marktwirtschaft [1971] (n 29) 87; Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (n 26) 14. 
41 Padilla and Ahlborn (n 5) 80–81. 
42 James S Venit, ‘Article 82: The Last Frontier - Fighting Fire with Fire’ (2004) 28(4) Fordham International Law Journal 
1157, 1158; Padilla and Ahlborn (n 5) 81; Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe (n 7) 239. 
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that they clearly advocated in favour of competition as the most efficient instrument to increase total 
welfare.43 By increasing welfare, competition contributes to the general interest of a democratic polity 
and, thereby, enhances the output-oriented legitimacy of the system. Nonetheless, unlike the welfarist 
approach, the Freiburg School did not perceive efficiency as the sole and ultimate goal of competition. 
Instead, it underlined that the efficiency-enhancing nature of competition must be reconciled with other 
goals ensuring a humane, free and democratic economic order.44 Hence, efficiency is conceived as an 
important ‘by-product’45 of the competitive process, rather than as the ultimate goal of competition.  
Consequently, the ordoliberals stressed not only the value of efficiency but also underlined the 
importance of economic freedom. They conceived economic freedom in a multidimensional way as 
private autonomy, freedom of choice for consumers and producers46 and freedom to compete (market 
access).47 Economic freedom constitutes, pursuant to the ordoliberal idea of interdependence48 between 
the economic, social and political order, the precondition and counterpart of other fundamental and 
political rights such as the freedom of speech, the freedom of assembly, as well as the right to vote.49 
From this perspective, the exercise of economic freedom plays a similar role to that of political rights: 
it is essential for the good functioning of a democratic polity.50 Therefore, the individual citizen cannot 
entirely enjoy her democratic economic and political fundamental rights if her autonomy is limited in 
the economic sphere by the exercise of arbitrary economic power by other citizens or the state.51 At the 
same time, the ordoliberal concern for ensuring a socially sustainable economic order and the republican 
ideal of equal rights and freedoms also explain why economic freedom should not be perceived as an 
absolute and unrestricted individual right.52 Thus, the exercise of economic freedom must be allowed as 
far as it does not undermine other citizens’ economic freedom. 53 
In this respect, the dispersal of public and private economic power is an important feature of both 
competition and democracy, since it guarantees individual autonomy in both aspects, as economic and 
political freedom.54 On the one hand, by setting bounds to economic power, competition law warrants a 
free and fair competitive process. On the other hand, the dispersal of economic power through 
                                                     
43 Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (n 26) 306. 
44 ibid 140,305. Miksch, Wettbewerb als Aufgabe - Grundsätze einer Wettbewerbsordnung (n 32) 210–222. 
45 Möschel (n 28) 146. 
46 Franz Böhm, ‘Freiheit und Ordnung in der Marktwirtschaft [1971]’ in Nils Goldschmidt (ed), Grundtexte zur Freiburger 
Tradition der Ordnungsökonomik (Mohr Siebeck 2008) 305. Miksch, Wettbewerb als Aufgabe - Grundsätze einer 
Wettbewerbsordnung (n 32) 221. Peter Behrens, ‘The "Consumer Choice Paradigm" in German Ordoliberalism and its 
Impact upon EU Competition Law’ (Eurpa-Kolleg Hamburg - Discussion Paper N°1/14 2014). 
47 Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (n 12) 48; 250; Heike Schweitzer, ‘Efficiency, Political freedom and the Freedom 
to Compete: Comment on Maier-Rigaud’ in Daniel Zimmer (ed), The Goals of Competition Law (Elgar 2012) 175–177. 
48 Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (n 26) 16, 304-308. 
49 ibid 50. Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, ‘Wirtschaftsordnung und Staatsverfassung’ in Franz Böhm, Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker 
and Heinz Sauermann (eds), Wirtschaftsordnung und Staatsverfassung: Festschrift f. Franz Böhm z. 80. Geburtstag (Mohr 
Siebeck 1975) 385. 
50 Franz Böhm, ‘Das Problem der privaten Macht. Ein Beitrag zur Monopolfrage [1928]’ in Nils Goldschmidt (ed), Grundtexte 
zur Freiburger Tradition der Ordnungsökonomik (Mohr Siebeck 2008) 63.  
51 Franz Böhm, ‘Die Bedeutung der Wirtschaftsordnung für die politische Verfassung: Kritische Betrachtungen zu dem Aufsatz 
von Ministerialrat Dr. Adolf ARNDT über das »Problem der Wirtschaftsdemokratie in den Verfassungsentwürfen«’ (1946) 
1(6) Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung 141, 141. 
52 Miksch, Wettbewerb als Aufgabe - Grundsätze einer Wettbewerbsordnung (n 32) 221. 
53 This means that ordoliberal freedom reflects a republican ideal according to which a person or group enjoys freedom to the 
extent that no other person or group has ‘the capacity to interfere in [its] affairs on an arbitrary basis.’ See Philip Pettit, 
‘Freedom as Antipower’ (1996) 106(3) Ethics 576; Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A theory of freedom and government 
(Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press 1997); Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (n 12) 250. 
54 Mestmäcker, ‘Wirtschaftsordnung und Staatsverfassung’ (n 49) 384. 
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competition ensures the integrity and impartiality of the political institutions, for it makes interest 
capture less likely.55 By imposing checks and balances on private and public market power, competition 
protects political institutions and decision-making processes and guarantees an inviolable sphere of 
private activity.56 Accordingly, competition as conceived by the ordoliberals not only stimulates 
welfare-maximizing behaviour, but constitutes above all the ‘most remarkable and ingenious instrument 
for reducing power known in history’.57 
Moreover, the ordoliberal paradigm assumes that a competitive economic order is the precondition for 
the realisation of an open, pluralistic market. Accordingly, competition is perceived as fair, as long as 
market actors have equal opportunities to participate in the economic process.58 For ordoliberals, the 
abuse of private or public market power leads to the arbitrary exclusion of market participants, and, 
thereby, reduces their opportunities to participate in the competitive process.59 In contrast, a well-
functioning competitive market leads only to the exclusion of the less efficient market players. 
Therefore, in the absence of abuses of excessive economic power, the competitive process guarantees 
economic freedom as equality of all,60 and ensures that economic inequalities are only the result of 
different economic performance of the individual market participants and not the outcome of arbitrary 
power.61 
Pursuant to the ordoliberals competition constitutes a ‘plebiscitary’62 coordination process for the 
allocation of resources resting upon the guarantee of freedom and equality of opportunity. Consumers’ 
choice steers the economy in the same way as citizens’ votes influence political processes.63 As long as 
no market participant is unfairly excluded from the process of competition, the results of competition 
are similar to the outcomes of a democratic procedure legitimised as a fair expression of the ‘volonté 
générale’.64 In this respect, the ordoliberal paradigm conceives competition itself as a democratic and 
pluralistic economic institution. This means that it forges a positive link between competition and 
democracy. Ordoliberal competition accommodates the consequentialist goal of welfare maximization 
on the one hand, and the two procedural goals of economic freedom and fairness on the other. Hence, 
competition reinforces a democratic regime in a composite way; it enhances the input-oriented and the 
output-oriented legitimacy of the economic process. Competition makes the market an institution 
conducive to democracy. Competition is, therefore, from the ordoliberal perspective, an important, but 
not sufficient precondition and element of democracy.  
                                                     
55 Böhm, ‘Democracy and Economic Power in Cartel and Monopoly in Modern Law [1961]’ (n 30) 273–279. 
56 Böhm, ‘Die Bedeutung der Wirtschaftsordnung für die politische Verfassung: Kritische Betrachtungen zu dem Aufsatz von 
Ministerialrat Dr. Adolf ARNDT über das »Problem der Wirtschaftsdemokratie in den Verfassungsentwürfen«’ (n 51) 141. 
57 Böhm, ‘Democracy and Economic Power in Cartel and Monopoly in Modern Law [1961]’ (n 30) 279. See also Eucken 
describing competition as “instrument for the deprivation of power (Entmachtungsinstrument)” Walter Eucken, ‘The 
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Verfassung: Kritische Betrachtungen zu dem Aufsatz von Ministerialrat Dr. Adolf ARNDT über das »Problem der 
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62 Böhm, ‘Freiheit und Ordnung in der Marktwirtschaft [1971]’ (n 46) 305; Foucault (n 24) 167. 
63 Böhm, ‘Freiheit und Ordnung in der Marktwirtschaft [1971]’ (n 46) 305. 
64 Böhm, ‘Democracy and Economic Power in Cartel and Monopoly in Modern Law [1961]’ (n 30) 268. 
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The welfarist approach contends that democracy can claim legitimate authority due to its welfare 
maximizing properties.65 Competition is legitimate as long as it ensures beneficial outcomes for the 
democratic polity. By contrast, the procedural goals of economic freedom and fairness hint towards a 
deontological understanding of competition as a process. Such an understanding corresponds to a 
procedural conception of democracy, which cannot exist without the protection of certain deontological 
goals such as freedom, autonomy and equality of opportunity. Thus, the ordoliberal paradigm, without 
ignoring the welfare-enhancing qualities of competition, emphasizes its procedural dimension. Such an 
approach underlines that in certain occasions the output-oriented mechanisms (consequentialist values) 
are inadequate to legitimize the system. Input-oriented mechanisms (deontological values) should 
delimit the latter, and, thereby, ensure that the pursuit of certain outcomes does not lead to occasions 
where the existential conditions of the system could be undermined.  
Nevertheless, it is important to notice that while ordoliberals assume that the protection of economic 
freedom under normal circumstances also enhances welfare and efficiency,66 they clearly prioritize in 
case of conflict the procedural goals of economic freedom and fairness over the consequentialist ones.67 
In this respect, ordoliberalism clearly differs from the welfarist approach, which derives the legitimacy 
of competition exclusively from its welfare-maximizing properties.68 More provocatively, by 
transposing into the economic sphere the Lockean idea of the necessity for democracy bounds of power, 
the ordoliberals made sure that economic freedom was not sacrificed in the quest for beneficial 
outcomes. By contrast, the welfarist approach rejects any form of limitation of the pursuit of efficiency. 
Every restriction of freedom or fairness violation could be legitimized on the basis of welfare 
maximization. Yet, underplaying the role of freedom and fairness may turn competition into an unjust 
institution.  
Institutional rules and a form-based approach as precondition of a positive nexus 
This account of both dimensions of the οrdoliberal competition-democracy nexus, however, raises the 
question of how the οrdoliberals get from the negative dimension, where the deterioration of competition 
undermines democracy, to the positive dimension, where competition contributes to democracy. In fact, 
the experience of two negative historical examples – laissez-faire liberalism and centrally planned 
economy69 – made ordoliberals typify two types of failing economic organisation that had also 
detrimental political ramifications.  
From these experiences the οrdoliberals gained the insight that the main reason for the failure of 
competition and the deteriorating effects of economic power on democracy was the insufficient 
application of the rule of law in economic matters.70 In fact, they recognised that competition as an 
ordering principle of the economy suffers from its fragile nature. Competition could only exist and 
deploy its beneficial effects in form of the positive nexus under certain conditions.71 For the οrdoliberals 
the competitive market did not just happen; it is an institutional structure that follows certain political 
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and legal decision-making. Contrary to the neo-liberal conception of the market as a ‘natural order’,72 a 
competitive market economy could not be established and sustained by the mere unrestricted interplay 
of market forces.73 To put it differently, competition as ‘rules of the game’ cannot be guaranteed by the 
‘market game’ itself in form of a spontaneous order. Instead, competitive markets could be achieved 
only via an artificial, state-created legal arrangement, which incorporates certain rules and organizing 
principles and provides for a certain form of the economic process.74 Thus, competition and markets are 
considered to be products of deliberate political and legal action by the state.75 
The legal rules set forth an institutional framework that is based on the ordoliberal notions of the ‘private 
law society’ (Privatrechtsgesellschaft) 76 and the ‘Economic Constitution’. (Wirtschaftsverfassung). On 
the one hand, the institutions of private law enable economic exchanges by providing the basic means 
for autonomous economic planning. At the same time, they delimit the legitimate scope of private 
autonomy.77 Thus, from the equality of all before the (private) law follows that equal freedom of each 
constitutes a limit for the freedom of every other individual.78 On the other hand, the ‘Economic 
Constitution’ represents a fundamental economic policy decision (ordnungspolitische 
Gesamtentscheidung) in favour of a specific form of a competitive economic order.79 By circumscribing 
the scope of legitimate private action and by imposing the rule of law not only on the state, but also on 
all private market players, the ‘Economic Constitution’ protects the institution of competition, as well 
as the economic freedom of the market participants.80  
The positive link between competition and democracy also materializes in the ordoliberal form-based 
approach towards competition and in particular in their conception of competition as a rivalrous market 
structure.81 By virtue of its procedural, non-hierarchical characteristics competition constitutes from an 
ordoliberal perspective the sole market regime that is compatible with democracy, for it guarantees for 
each market participant an equal sphere of autonomy on which no other market player may impinge.82 
This idea of competition as a non-hierarchical and freedom-enhancing process is intertwined with the 
                                                     
72 The idea of the competitive market as natural order could be traced in Bork’s and Posner’s description of competition as 
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protection of a competitive market structure ensuring rivalry.83 Only the preservation of a market 
structure characterised by a sufficient number of players can safeguard competition as a checks-and-
balances system where the players constrain each other’s market power and preserve consumers’ 
freedom of choice.84 
As a result, certain categories of market conduct are incompatible with this ideal type of a non-
hierarchical process of coordination of autonomous plans, since they may undermine the economic 
freedom or equality of opportunity of other market participants. For this purpose, the ordoliberals 
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate categories of competition in the form of business 
practices. This distinction is epitomised in the dichotomy between ‘performance competition’ 
(Leistungswettbewerb) and ‘impediment competition’ (Behinderungswettbewerb).85 The category of 
performance competition encompasses business conduct based on economic performance in terms of 
lower prices, higher quality or product variety or innovation. Conversely, business practices to which 
enterprises could only recur thanks to considerable market power fall under the category of ‘hindrance 
competition’ when they result in an unduly exclusion of competitors. These practices are deemed 
illegitimate due to their hierarchy-inducing coercive nature.86  
In this setting, the form-based approach establishes ex ante certain categories of business behaviour such 
as cartel agreements, fidelity rebates, predatory pricing, price-discrimination, refusals to deal as illegal,87 
based on the presumption that they are harmful to competition by restricting the rights of market 
participants in terms of economic freedom, equality of opportunity and/or since they reduce welfare. 
Undoubtedly, these presumptions remain rebuttable and could be amended or abandoned in light of 
emerging economic knowledge.  
Nonetheless, this form-based approach clearly differs from a fully-fledged welfarist approach, which 
relies exclusively on the utilitarian calculus of welfare maximization as the only criterion for 
legitimizing legal rules and assessing the legality of economic conduct.88 As a consequence, while such 
an approach argues in favour of appraising merely the actual welfare-maximizing or -reducing 
consequences of a business practice, the ordoliberals also consider the conformity of such practices with 
the other values of the competitive process.89 By balancing different goals and values in order to ensure 
the input- and output-oriented legitimacy of the competitive process, the ordoliberal approach does not 
rely solely on balancing welfare-enhancing and -reducing effects, but rather carries out a balancing test 
of conflicting individual rights, freedoms and interests. 90 
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The competition-democracy nexus and European Competition Law 
In this part, we argue that despite the current orthodoxy according to which competition law is desirable 
solely for its welfare-maximizing properties, the structure of EU Competition Law and the case law of 
the Court seem to be compatible in many instances with an ordoliberal understanding of competition 
law91 and the idea of a competition-democracy nexus. The argument made here is not that the Court 
relies exclusively on ordoliberalism when deciding competition cases. On the contrary, the Court’s 
reasoning often appears to be quite eclectic, for it often oscillates between ordoliberal concepts and a 
more economic approach.92 Moreover, inconsistencies in the Court’s case law93 hint towards inner 
tensions. In fact, in several cases the Court seems divided between different approaches rather than 
monolithically endorsing a clearly ordoliberal or a ‘more economic’ position.94 The welfarist rationale 
of the more economic approach, however, fails to explain this eclectic approach and the Court’s inner 
tensions. The ordoliberal concept of a competition-democracy nexus might, therefore, complement and 
enhance our understanding of EU Competition Law and the Court’s reasoning. 
The influence and persistence of the ordoliberal idea of a link between competition and democracy could 
be traced in the field of Art. 101 and Art. 102 TFEU primarily in the CJEU’s deontological 
understanding of competition based on its procedural characteristics (i); the Court’s balancing of 
procedural and consequentialist goals (ii); the Court’s form-based approach (iii), that could also be 
responsive to input from economics (iv). From this perspective, the idea of a competition-democracy 
nexus may explain better the content and interpretation of Art. 101 and 102 TFEU than does a fully-
fledged welfarist approach. Moreover, contrary to what is adduced by the proponents of the ‘more 
economic approach’, the ordoliberal competition-democracy nexus is not necessarily bound to an 
economically illiterate formalistic approach, but could accommodate current economic thinking. Hence, 
even though ordoliberalism does not offer a complete analytical model,95 its conception of a 
competition-democracy nexus allows for economically informed categorical thinking and in that way it 
could be a first step towards a European School in Competition Law. 
The CJEU’s ordoliberal understanding of competition 
Firstly, the ordoliberal idea of a competition-democracy nexus can be traced in CJEU’s institutional 
understanding of competition. In the field of Art. 101 TFEU, the Court stressed in T-Mobile Netherlands 
that ‘Article 81 EC, like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is designed to protect not only the 
immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers, but also to protect the structure of the 
market and thus competition as such’.96 Similarly, with regard to Art. 102 TFEU the Court highlighted 
already in Continental Can that ‘[t]he provision [of Art. 86] is not only aimed at practices which may 
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cause damage to consumers directly, but also at those which are detrimental to them through their impact 
on an effective competition structure, such as is mentioned in Article 3 (f) of the Treaty’.97  
The Court has resisted the welfarist orientation of the Commission's modernization initiative.98 In one 
of the first cases after the issuance of the Commission Guidance Paper on Art. 82 EC the Court re-
affirmed that the function of competition rules is ’to prevent competition from being distorted to the 
detriment of the public interest, individual undertakings and consumers’.99 By recognizing that margin 
squeeze is a stand-alone practice, the Court highlighted that consumer welfare is not the sole goal of EU 
Competition Law.100 Protecting the competitive process implied that the very existence of margin 
squeeze, absent of any objective justification, was abusive, without the need to establish that the retail 
prices to end-users were in themselves excessive or predatory.101 This followed from the fact that Art. 
102 TFEU does not focus exclusively on practices that directly harm consumers, but also aims at 
protecting consumers from practices that indirectly harm them due to their negative impact on 
competition.102 In a similar vein, the Court also starkly rejected in GlaxoSmithKline the General 
Court’s103 attempt to adopt consumer-welfare as the exclusive standard for finding a restriction of 
competition.104 
The Court's approach, thus, does not fall short of the ordoliberal topos that competition is not only a 
means to achieve consumer welfare.105 Competition is also perceived as an end the protection of which 
is in the ‘public interest’ of a democratic society. Hence, this understanding of competition clearly 
embodies the ordoliberal perception of competition as a process and institution that preserves a rivalrous 
market structure and has an intrinsic value.106 Such a structure simultaneously guarantees and promotes 
both outcome-oriented and procedural goals and values that are indispensable for a democratic economic 
order. The Court’s wording suggests that the consequentialist goal of welfare and the deontological 
values of freedom and equality of opportunity are equally important for competition. Such a value 
pluralistic approach implies that both goals should be protected on equal terms and that there is no 
hierarchy among these independent values within the European Competition Law framework, contrary 
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to what the welfarist approach maintains.107 Instead, it clearly underscores the ordoliberal idea that both 
types of goals must be balanced, so as to guarantee the input- and output-oriented legitimacy of 
competition as a democratic institution. 
Conceptualizing competition as an institution based also on deontological values is fundamentally 
different from a welfarist approach. According to the latter, all social institutions should be evaluated 
exclusively depending on their consequences on individuals’ well-being.108 In this respect, the value of 
competition derives entirely from its welfare maximization properties and is justified as long as it 
increases society’s welfare.109 Thus, EU Competition Law should be perceived as an instrument for 
enhancing welfare without having value per se.110 Such an approach bases the legitimacy of competition 
only on its output-oriented characteristics, without taking into account the importance of its procedural 
characteristics and its role within a democratic polity.  
On the contrary, the ordoliberal paradigm maintains that competition constitutes an end in itself, separate 
from the outcomes that may be produced for consumers, economic efficiency, market integration or 
industrial growth. The process itself contains an inherent value and cannot be abolished, even if it is not 
always the most effective mode to reach welfare maximization.111 In light of the above, it becomes clear 
that by securing the independence of competitors’ decision-making capacity, the law protects individual 
autonomy as a prerequisite of the competitive process.112  
Moreover, the Court’s reference to a competitive market structure makes the ordoliberal concept of the 
‘competitive process’ more tangible as a deontological goal. Competition is perceived as a sort of 
checks-and-balances system in which the independent decisions of individual market players constrain 
each other’s exercise of economic power and create a form of interdependence between them. 
Furthermore, a sufficient degree of diversity of market players is necessary for the consumers to be able 
to choose freely. Accordingly, the competitive process relies on the preservation of a certain degree of 
rivalry and thus on a certain number of at the same time independent and interdependent players that 
reciprocally constrain their exercise of legitimate economic freedom and power.  
This might explain why in its recent Post Danmark II judgement the Court points out the importance of 
even less-efficient competitors for competition in a highly-concentrated market characterised by 
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significant entry barriers.113 In light of the existing case law, this point is innovative. For instance, in 
TeliaSonera, the Court held that the dominant company’s margin squeeze had a likely exclusionary 
effect, for it excluded equally efficient undertakings.114 In this case, the Court used a cost-based test, in 
order to determine the boundaries of freedom of the market players and ensure equality of opportunity 
among rivals.115 Yet, in Post Danmark II116 the Court recognized the limitations of the as efficient 
competitor test and took a step forward.117 Accordingly, the goal of EU Competition Law to protect 
competition as such may reflect a fundamental presumption in favour of market structures that are 
compatible with and conducive to a democratic polity.  
Balancing deontological and consequentialist goals 
Another element of the influence of the nexus idea on the application of Art. 101 and 102 TFEU is 
reflected in the balancing of consequentialist and deontological values as a precondition of the 
competitive process’ input- and output-oriented legitimacy. The ordoliberal framework is based on and 
ensures the values of freedom and equality of opportunity, which normally also lead to the maximisation 
of total and/or consumer welfare. However, in the case of conflict, the ordoliberals underline the 
necessity of striking a balance between deontological and consequentialist goals, so as to ensure an 
alignment between output-oriented and input-oriented legitimacy. 
This idea explains the inner rationale and the structure of Art. 101 TFEU better than does a fully-fledged 
welfarist approach. The wording of Art. 101(1) TFEU in its very general terms catches agreements 
between firms that impose restrictions of competition. This, though, does not mean that any restriction 
in the freedom of action of an undertaking constitutes simultaneously a restriction of competition.118 
Such an interpretation would be absurd since restraints of trade are the essence of any contract.119 
Accordingly, Art. 101(1) TFEU prohibits any undue restriction of the economic freedom of the parties 
or other market participants.120 This means that what at first sight may seem as a restriction of 
competition is not considered as such after a closer look.121 Reduction of competition between the parties 
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does not necessarily have an impact on competition in the market.122 This is why restrictions of 
competition cannot be established in abstracto and should always be assessed against the background 
of the competition that would have existed in their absence.123 Therefore, the prohibition of Art. 101(1) 
is not incompatible with the ordoliberal understanding of competition as a process whereby equal and 
autonomous market actors participate in the economy without overwhelming constraints from private 
and public power.124  
At the same time, Art. 101(3) TFEU provides the conditions under which a restriction of freedom could 
be justified and provides guidelines for the balancing of economic freedom and welfare. In particular, 
pursuant to Article 101(3) TFEU a vertical or horizontal restriction of competition qualifies for an 
exemption from the general prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU as long as it satisfies two positive and 
two negative conditions. The two positive conditions refer to the economic benefit and the consumer 
benefit of the anti-competitive agreement or practice, whereas the two negative conditions include the 
indispensability of the agreement for the realization of the relevant objectives and the absence of a 
substantial elimination of competition in the relevant market.125 Given that restrictions of competition 
could be excused in virtue of their redeeming values, it becomes apparent that Art. 101 TFEU was 
designed in such a way so as to allow balancing the consequentialist and deontological values of 
competition.  
In addition, the fourth requirement of non-elimination of substantial competition is based on the idea 
that economic freedom and the competitive process have an inherent value that cannot be fully attributed 
to actual beneficial consequences. This criterion calls for an analysis of the competitive restraints 
imposed on the parties, the remaining competitive pressures on the market and the impact of the 
agreement on competition.126 Consequently, certain restrictions of freedom could not be justified no 
matter what the utilitarian calculus of costs and benefits may say. The upshot is that a market structure 
based on rivalry is not only considered an essential driver of economic efficiency, but also as a 
procedural safeguard of a non-hierarchical coordination of the economy that is compatible with 
democracy. 127 Rivalry motivates a mechanism of checks and balances that preserves economic freedom 
and in this sense competition as a process has an autonomous value independent of its welfare 
maximizing properties. Thus, certain restrictive practices could be justified as long as they do not 
undermine rivalry to an extent, which eliminates the conditions of its own existence.128 This echoes the 
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ordoliberal view that certain procedural characteristics of competition should not be fully eliminated 
regardless of any positive or negative consequences.  
Article 102 TFEU reflects a similar ordoliberal concern to accommodate procedural and 
consequentialist goals. Abuse of dominance case law is driven by the objective to ensure the competitive 
process, and thereby enhances both the input- and output-oriented legitimacy of EU Competition Law. 
The procedural goal of economic freedom, as a central value of the competition-democracy nexus is a 
leitmotif of numerous Art. 102 cases.129 The Court’s case law reflects a two-fold understanding of 
economic freedom that encompasses both the freedom to compete (market access) and the freedom of 
choice of purchasers and consumers. The close relationship between these two forms of economic 
freedom is apparent in the Court’s reasoning on exclusive purchasing agreements and rebates. In these 
cases, the Court repeatedly held that exclusive purchasing agreements and loyalty rebates granted by a 
dominant undertaking to its different purchasers constitute anti-competitive practices, for they are 
‘designed to deprive the purchaser of or restrict his possible choices of sources of supply and to deny 
other producers access to the market’130 
The competition-democracy nexus, moreover, materialises in the Court’s concern to guarantee fairness 
and equality of opportunity under Art. 102 TFEU. This ordoliberal concern has long been misunderstood 
by the literature. Commentators ascribed the fact that, in contrast to Section 2 of the US Sherman Act, 
Art. 102 TFEU also prohibits exploitative abuses to ordoliberalism’s excessive concern about fairness 
and its over-regulatory understanding of competition law. 131 More recent contributions, however, 
pointed out that ordoliberalism is mostly concerned with exclusive abuses and that it was not the 
German, but the French delegation, which suggested during the negotiations of the Treaty of Rome 
establishing a prohibition of exploitative abuses of dominance.132 On the contrary, the ordoliberal 
understanding of fairness as equality of opportunity calls for tackling exclusionary practices under Art. 
102 TFEU. Thus, the ordoliberal concern about fairness is directly intertwined with economic freedom, 
and aims at preserving open markets as a level playing field that provides every market player with 
equal opportunities to participate in the competitive process.  
Equality of opportunity plays for instance a role in margin squeeze cases where the Court found the said 
pricing practice as abusive due to its unfair exclusionary effect.133 In addition, in Deutsche Telekom the 
Court stressed ‘that a system of undistorted competition can be guaranteed only if equality of 
opportunity is secured as between the various economic operators’.134 The Court further established a 
direct link between the principle of equality of opportunity and the as-efficient competitor test by 
holding that ‘equality of opportunity means that the appellant and its equally efficient competitors are 
placed on an equal footing in the retail market in end-user access services’.135 In this respect, the Court 
is not always confined to the efficiency rationale underlying the more economic approach according to 
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which legal institutions in general and EU Competition Law in particular should ignore fairness concerns 
and be exclusively guided by welfare considerations.136  
Interestingly, similarly to Art. 101 TFEU, the Court has tried to balance economic freedom and fairness 
with efficiency considerations in abuse of dominance cases. Already in Hoffman-La Roche the Court 
recognised that the procedural goals might be restricted in case of an ‘objective economic 
justification’.137 In British Airways the Court clearly recognised an efficiency-based defence akin to the 
test applied under Art. 101 (3) TFEU. Accordingly, the objective justification allows the dominant 
undertaking to rebut the presumption of illegality of its conduct by showing that its exclusionary or anti-
competitive effect is outweighed by efficiency gains.138 The Commission’s Guidance Paper on Art. 82 
EC underlines that the same four conditions as under Art. 101 (3) TFEU must be fulfilled to allow a 
practice to benefit from an objective efficiency-justification.139 By replicating the fourth condition 
according to which the conduct may ‘not eliminate effective competition, by removing all or most 
existing sources of actual or potential competition’,140 the Guidance Paper acknowledges the ordoliberal 
concern of also protecting procedural aspects of competition so as to ensure an effective mix of input- 
and output-oriented legitimacy. 
In general terms, the competition-democracy nexus which relies on a balance between outcome- and 
process-oriented values could explain the Court’s and Commission’s two-fold approach under both 
articles. First, the authority examines whether a deviation from the principle of competition has occurred 
(restriction of competition) and, second, whether such a restriction of competition could be justified.141 
By contrast, such an approach would not make any sense under a fully-fledged welfarist approach: either 
a business practice restricts consumer welfare and, consequently, is to be prohibited by competition 
rules; or its positive consequences outweigh its negative welfare-effects, and it should be allowed. In 
the latter case, the practice at stake did not restrict competition in the first place. 
A form-based approach towards competition and competition law 
The competition-democracy nexus could also be associated with the Court’s form-based approach. 
Under Art. 101 TFEU, the form-based approach is primarily reflected in the Court’s reliance on a 
dichotomy between by-object and by-effect restrictions for classifying anti-competitive agreements and 
practices. The by-object category includes agreements that are by their very nature liable to restrict 
competition.142 Properly understood, this concept includes agreements that have a clear and objective 
purpose to restrict competition,143 or that are likely to have a negative impact on competition.144 This 
category includes a non-exhaustive list of agreements145 that ’reveal a sufficient degree of harm to 
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competition.’146 Thus, the by-object category does not contain a fixed list of practices that could be 
automatically typified as anticompetitive. It constitutes an open-textured concept grounded on an 
analytic criterion: does a business conduct reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition? Under this 
criterion, the Court classifies obvious hardcore restrictions and inchoate offences under the object 
category.147  
It is important to note, though, that in order to establish a by-object restriction the Court engages in a 
fairly rigorous legal and economic analysis of the agreement.148 As already mentioned, the by-object 
category is not confined solely to certain types of agreements. It generally covers agreements where a 
sufficiently deleterious effect on competition may be presumed on the basis of economic analysis.149 As 
a result, determining whether an agreement falls within the by-object category requires from the Court 
to take into consideration the content of its provisions, its objectives and its economic and legal context, 
the nature of the goods or services affected, as well as the real conditions of the functioning and structure 
of the market or markets in question.150 In other words, demonstrating certain effects is part of an object 
assessment.151 Hence, the restriction by object is not a static notion and the Court does not adhere to 
rigid formalism.  
If a certain agreement falls within the by-object category, there is no need to establish its negative actual 
or potential economic effects on competitors or consumers.152 It is not necessary to demonstrate actual 
distortions of competition or a direct link between the agreement and consumer prices.153 It is sufficient 
to show that the agreement has the potential to incur a negative impact on competition having regard to 
its specific legal and economic context. On the contrary, the by-effect restriction refers to more blurry 
and complex violations that require an analysis of the actual and/or potential effects of the agreement 
on the relevant market(s) to be established.154  For an agreement to be restrictive by effect it must 
affect appreciably actual or potential competition to such an extent that negative effects can be expected 
with a reasonable degree of probability on prices, output, innovation or the variety or quality of goods 
and services in the relevant market.155  
Given that an examination of the context could be required before it can be concluded whether a 
particular restraint constitutes a restriction by object,156 it can be asked what the bifurcation stands for. 
According to the Court, the difference between the two categories ‘lies in the fact that, with a restriction 
of competition by object, the negative interference with market conditions is so clear that the agreement 
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can be presumed, without any detailed market analysis, to have a restrictive effect’.157 Under this 
rationale, certain agreements are presumed to be highly capable of reducing the competitive pressures 
in the market, increasing prices above or reducing output below the competitive level. Absent an 
objective justification,158 such agreements should be prohibited. If a practice does not fall within the by-
object category, its anti-competitive potential is not obvious and, thereby, a careful examination of its 
effects should take place. In both cases, the assessment is not formulaic and involves economic analysis. 
Yet, how much analysis should be undertaken when determining whether a particular agreement belongs 
to the one category or the other remains unclear.159 However, certain indeterminacy is inherent to such 
open textured notions and allows the Court, as will be shown below, to be responsive to lessons from 
economics. 
Due to its indeterminacy and, correlatively, because of the legal uncertainty it creates, defendants,160 
national courts161 and even the General Court162 have repeatedly challenged the Art. 101(1) TFEU 
bifurcation. Nevertheless, the Court has persistently relied on the said tool so as to conduct its 
competition assessment. This may be explained by the fact that judicial decision-making is essentially 
linked to the use of presumptions to channel factual inquiries and economize the need to examine the 
actual circumstances.163 Moreover, since an investigation of the actual effects of an agreement demands 
a more intensive and costly economic analysis, the by-object option saves resources, creates legal 
certainty and allows all market participants to adapt their conduct. 164  
Nonetheless, it seems that there is an additional reason supporting the Court’s approach. A form-based 
approach towards Art. 101(1) TFEU aims to identify practices that presumptively undermine the 
competitive procedure. Such practices could distort competition as a non-hierarchical process, weaken 
its procedural values and, thereby, its input-oriented legitimacy. If the said practices have the capacity 
to undermine competition as a process, it is also inferred that they have the potential to undermine the 
output-oriented legitimacy of competition. This explains why such practices are prima facie prohibited 
and would be allowed only in virtue of their redeeming virtues.  
By contrast, under the welfarist approach the analytical method adopted by the Courts and the 
Commission should be abandoned and replaced by an in-depth investigation of the welfare-effects of 
the practice at stake. Pursuant to such an approach an undertaking's conduct would be deemed ‘pro-‘ or 
‘anti-‘ competitive solely due to its actual consequences on welfare.165 From that perspective, the 
abovementioned bifurcation would be redundant and excessively formalistic since the essential criterion 
should be whether the restraint increases or reduces welfare. Put differently, given that the weighing of 
                                                     
157 AG Trstenjak in Opinion in C-501/06 P Commission v GlaxoSmithKline (n 144) para. 92. 
158 Case T-17/93 Matra Hachette v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1994:89 para. 85. 
159 Whish and Bailey (n 13) 124–125. 
160 Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission (n 94). 
161 Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands BV and Others (n 96). 
162 Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission (n 94) para. 112. 
163 Barak Orbach, ‘The Durability of Formalism in Antitrust’ (2015) 100 Iowa Law Review 2197, 2203. 
164 AG Kokott in Opinion in Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands BV and Others (n 96) para. 43; King (n 143), 273; Matthew 
Bennett and A. J Padilla, ‘Article 81 EC Revisited: Deciphering European Commission Antitrust Goals and Rules’ in 
Xavier Vives (ed), Competition Policy in the EU : Fifty Years on from the Treaty of Rome (Oxford University Press 2009) 
62–65. 
165 For instance, Williamson explains that if the objective of competition policy is to promote efficiency, then a monopolizing 
merger should be allowed if it generates sufficiently large savings from gains in economies of scale so as to ‘compensate’ 
for any losses suffered by consumers. Oliver E Williamson, ‘Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs’ 
(1968) 58(1) The American Economic Review 18. All adepts of the welfarist approach do however, not accept this method 
of antitrust analysis. Daniel A Crane, ‘The Tempting of Antitrust: Robert Bork and the Goals of Antitrust Policy’ (2014) 
79 Antitrust Law Journal 835, 850.  
 
Exploring the ordoliberal paradigm: The competition-democracy nexus 
European University Institute 21 
pro- and anti-competitive effects is left for 101(3) TFEU the welfarist approach cannot make sense of 
the Art. 101(1) bifurcation.166 In this case, a fully-fledged welfarist approach would reduce competition 
law to pure economic analysis and eliminate any necessity of striking a balance between the outcome- 
and the process-oriented goals of competition.167 Such a development would transform EU Competition 
Law into an unprincipled area of law totally dependent on empirical analysis.168  
The idea of a ‘competition-democracy nexus’ might also contribute to a better understanding of the 
Court’s form-based approach under Art. 102 TFEU. In particular, this idea could be used to make sense 
of persistent concepts such as ‘normal competition’ or ‘competition on the merits’, as well as the 
principle of ‘special responsibility’ of dominant undertakings. 
The category of ‘competition on the merits’ or ‘normal competition’ is a key concept of the Court’s 
reasoning under Art. 102. Indeed, the Court defines ‘abuse’ by contrasting it with ‘economic 
performance’,169 which complies with ‘competition on the merits’. Put differently, the Court utilizes 
form-based concepts to distinguish illegitimate business practices ‘from those, which condition normal 
competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators’.170 Both 
the concept of ‘normal competition’ and ‘competition on the merits’ embody the emphasis put by the 
Freiburger Schule on the specific procedural form of competition as a non-hierarchical coordination 
process, which is compatible with democratic values. Such an approach could reflect the ordoliberal 
distinction between the categories of ‘performance competition’ and ‘impediment competition’. 
Consequently, the Court relies on form-based legal presumptions regarding the anti-competitive 
character of certain categories of business practices such as predatory pricing, loyalty rebates, or price-
discrimination in order to articulate its analytical framework. Thus, based on existing economic 
‘experience’, this approach creates presumptions according to which certain practices constitute 
phenomena of normal economic interaction, whereas others must be regarded as having an anti-
competitive purpose.171  
Along the same lines, the ordoliberal competition-democracy nexus could explain the principle of 
‘special responsibility’ of dominant undertakings. In this regard, the Court continuously held that the 
dominant position of an undertaking as such is unproblematic under Art. 102 TFEU. However, by having 
substantial market power a dominant undertaking can act independently from certain competitive 
constraints.172 Thus, it bears ‘a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine 
undistorted competition on the common market’.173 The ‘special responsibility’ doctrine presupposes 
that the mere existence of dominance necessarily implies that ‘the structure of competition has already 
been weakened, and any further weakening of the structure of competition may constitute an abuse of a 
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dominant position’.174 Even though such a doctrine could be justified under a welfarist reasoning,175 in 
the European context it was triggered by the ordoliberal concern that the excessive concentration and 
abuse of economic power does not only bear the risk of undermining competition, but might also have 
detrimental political and social consequences.  
At this point it becomes apparent that ‘special responsibility’ is closely related to ‘competition on the 
merits’.176 Dominant undertakings bear certain obligations limiting their forms of participation in the 
competitive process. Thus, where the competitive process has already been weakened by the existence 
of dominance, the relevant firm should not further undermine the structure of competition. Otherwise, 
the dominant firm would be able to unilaterally change the ‘rules of the game’ by determining the 
number of competitors and the conditions of competition on the market.  
Often in the literature, 177 ordoliberalism is associated with the concept of ‘as-if competition’ coined by 
Eucken178 and Miksch179. This standard implies that the bearers of economic power should behave as if 
complete competition prevailed.180 Thus, the task of the competition authority is to regulate unavoidable 
monopolies and break up avoidable ones.181 Recent contributions have, however, underlined that the 
ordoliberal paradigm is not necessarily linked to the regulatory ‘as-if’ standard. Several ordoliberals and 
disciples of the Freiburger Schule have even criticized the said standard.182 In a certain way, the ‘as-if’ 
standard still resonates in the EU sector regulation of public utilities.183 Nonetheless, the principle of 
special responsibility restrains dominant players’ opportunity to have recourse to practices, which are 
not available under competitive conditions. In this non-regulatory sense, an (updated) ordoliberal ‘as-
if’ standard still influences EU Competition Law.184 
This form-based understanding clearly contrasts with the welfarist approach according to which the 
appropriate benchmark for the existence of effective competition is independent of the form of the 
competitive process or the structure of the market. Under the welfarist approach, a practice qualifies as 
abusive only if it inflicts actual or potential consumer harm.185 However, in this case the risk of false 
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negatives would be increased, since certain exclusionary practices that lessen competition and indirectly 
harm the consumers would be allowed. 
The adaptive nature of ordoliberalism 
As already mentioned, one of the main objections to ordoliberalism refers to its allegedly static and 
formalistic understanding of competition and competition law which goes in tandem with its neglect of 
economic thinking and welfare considerations.186 However, the competition-democracy nexus idea 
shows that the paradigm is not necessarily condemned to economically un-informed formalism. On the 
contrary, this form- and structure-based approach could be informed by economics. More importantly, 
by balancing outcome oriented and procedural goals, the said approach takes seriously efficiency 
considerations without falling into the trap of only protecting the ‘right to be efficient.’ In this regard, it 
enhances the democratic legitimacy of competition as an institution.  
For instance, in the area of Art. 101 TFEU the Court has articulated a form-based yet economically 
informed framework for protecting competition. As we saw, first, the Court investigates whether the 
agreement reveals a sufficient degree of harm to competition and, thereby, has as its object to restrict 
competition. In this case, the anticompetitive effects are presumed and the analysis moves to the 
balancing exercise of Art. 101(3) TFEU. If the agreement does not have an anticompetitive object, the 
Commission should establish its potential or actual anticompetitive effects. In this case, also the 
defendant can excuse her behavior by invoking agreement’s redeeming virtues under Art. 101(3) TFEU.  
The analytical categories of anticompetitive behaviour under Art. 101 TFEU are less fixed than most 
literature makes them appear.187 The Court in several cases has blurred the distinction between by-object 
and by-effect.188 Thus, the said bifurcation has not discouraged the Court from developing an analytical 
approach and forging a continuum. This function of the bifurcation is often ignored by the literature. 
Usually the object vs. effects debate is approached solely as a disagreement about substantive 
concepts.189 Yet, the main function of the bifurcation is procedural. It induces a burden–shifting 
framework for the evaluation of restrictions of competition. According to this framework, the plaintiff 
has the initial burden of demonstrating that the alleged restraint constitutes a restriction by-object by 
arguing that it has obviously produced or intends to produce substantial adverse effects on competition 
in the relevant market. If the plaintiff does not succeed, she may show that the restraint restricts 
competition by its effects. If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing either anticompetitive object or effect, 
then the burden shifts to the defendant, who must show that the redeeming virtues of the agreement 
outweigh its actual or potential negative impact on competition. If the defendant meets this burden, the 
plaintiff has to demonstrate that the anti-competitive effects of the agreement outweigh its pro-
competitive effects.190  
This exercise allows the Court to develop the best possible understanding of the case at hand.191 These 
rebuttable presumptions constitute a way for reasonably allocating the burden of proof in accordance 
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with categories of practices that are more or less likely to bear anti-competitive effects. In this context, 
the burden of proof is assigned to the stakeholder with a comparative advantage at each stage and 
imposes different evidentiary requirements on the parties. Such an approach uses economics as a tool to 
(a) determine the optimal degree of differentiation of competition rules and standards,192 and (b) inform 
competition analysis in specific cases.193 In this respect, modern economic thinking is not at odds with 
the case law on Art. 101 TFEU pursuant to which there is no bright line between by-object and by-effect 
restrictions, but rather a continuum. The bifurcation represents different degrees of judicial discretion.194 
This differentiated judicial discretion is continuously informed by economics. The latter effectively 
indicates what information may be excluded from the Court’s analysis, since it is impossible for the 
Court to consider all circumstances in each case.195  
The above shows that the Court, by interpreting an οrdoliberal provision and without abandoning a form-
based approach, was able to advance and modify forms without being confined to unworkable 
formalism.196 The Court has also remained apt to modify its forms, when they were found unable to 
capture the complexities of economic reality.197 It achieved this development by relying on the said 
bifurcation and drawing an economically sensitive continuum from by-object restrictions to restrictions 
by-effect coupled with a balancing exercise. This continuum, additionally, enabled the Court to avoid 
informality that would significantly expand its discretion and lead to arbitrary outcomes.198 
Consequently, economic analysis is not an exogenous force to Court’s form-based approach. It has been 
used by the Court in order to flesh out assumptions and presumptions and allocate the burden of proof.  
Another example of the adaptive nature of the said paradigm could be found in its compatibility with 
the EU Competition Law’s modernized approach towards vertical agreements. Vertical restraints have 
ambiguous effects on competition: on the one hand, they restrict (intra-brand) competition, competitive 
freedom and autonomy; on the other hand, they are in many cases welfare enhancing. Accordingly, it is 
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very difficult to say a priori which type of restraints is anti-competitive.199 However, ‘equal freedom for 
all imposes an inherent limit upon the freedom of each and every one and to this extent implies a kind 
of coercion for each and every person concerned’.200 This means that certain restraints of freedom of 
trade are not restrictions of competition, and also that it is necessary to distinguish benign from anti-
competitive freedom.201  
In this context, the modernized approach towards vertical restraints as reflected in the Block Exemption 
Regulation (‘BERs’)202 and the Guidelines203 rejects the claim that vertical restraints are per se anti-
competitive and calls for focusing on the impact on competition and efficiency before any definite 
conclusion. This approach, thus, provides guidance on how to balance outcome-oriented and procedural 
goals where these goals are in conflict.204 From this perspective, certain efficient restrictions of 
competition are acceptable, as long as they do not lead to an excessive concentration of market power 
or to coercion in the market. The latter should be avoided, as it could eliminate the procedural 
characteristics, which are indispensable for the democratic legitimacy of the competitive process. In 
other words, excessive concentration and coercion in the market, if not caught, would undermine 
competition as an institution of freedom. In this sense, the modern economically informed approach 
towards vertical restraints is not at odds with ordoliberal thinking.  
In the same vein, an updated understanding of the ordoliberal paradigm shows that the Court’s form-
based approach under Art. 102 is informed by economic reasoning. This is evident, for instance, if we 
look at the evolving understanding of the concept of dominance. The Court has not been satisfied with 
a static definition according to which dominance is identified by an established market share threshold 
that may allow for possible situation-specific deviations. Instead, it uses a comprehensive set of criteria 
indicating that a firm has appreciable freedom from competitive constraints and is able to act in ways 
that a competitively constrained firm could not.205  
In addition, the Court recently specified that the principles of special responsibility and competition on 
the merits are not aimed at protecting less efficient competitors206 and that not every exclusionary effect 
is detrimental to competition.207 On the contrary, the Court clarified that ‘competition on the merits may, 
by definition, lead to the departure from the market or the marginalisation of competitors that are less 
efficient and so less attractive to consumers from the point of view of, among other things, price, choice, 
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quality or innovation’.208 However, the General Court and the Court recognized the limitation of the 
more economic approach in Intel and Post Danmark II.209  
Specifically, in Intel the General Court concluded that contractual or de facto exclusive or quasi-
exclusive rebates, even if only applicable to certain market segments, infringe Article 102. Thus, the 
Commission was not required to employ a cost-based test and to demonstrate actual foreclosure or 
consumer harm.210 In this respect, the General Court rejected the relevance of the as efficient competitor 
test in cases of both exclusive and loyalty-inducing discounts.211 Given that such conduct had no 
objective justification other than to exclude a rival, it was prohibited under Article 102.212 Even though 
this holding has been starkly criticized as a step backwards towards a form-based approach,213 it could 
be argued that it is grounded on an economically apt, form-based approach. In particular, it sets a clear 
rule according to which quantity rebates are presumptively lawful; exclusivity rebates presumptively 
unlawful in the absence of an objective justification; and the ‘third category’ rebates require detailed 
analysis.214 In addition, the presumption of illegality of loyalty rebates could be economically 
justified.215 
This judgment does not sit uncomfortably with an ordoliberal understanding of competition. It shows 
that, contrary to what is often adduced by the literature,216 the ordoliberal categories of exclusionary 
abuses are not devoid of any economic reasoning or theory of harm. The question that ordoliberals are 
interested in is not whether loyalty rebates have positive or negative welfare effects. Instead, they choose 
a game-theoretic perspective, looking at the potential effect of a business practice by a dominant firm, 
in this case loyalty rebates, on the available strategies (i.e. choices) of its clients and competitors and, 
eventually, on the process of competition.217  
From this angle, the presumption of per se illegality relies on the observation that a dominant firm’s 
loyalty rebates – as opposed to quantity rebates – are not motivated by any underlying economic service 
in return. On the contrary, such practices have a loyalty enhancing ‘suction effect’218 and rearrange 
purchaser’s incentives and strategies. By increasing purchasers’ switching cost the dominant 
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undertaking also raises its rivals’ cost and, thereby, might exclude them from the market.219 Being 
concerned about competitors does not automatically mean not being concerned about competition.220 
This becomes apparent, especially, in cases where the dominant undertaking by excluding its 
competitors significantly reduces the competitive constraints in the market.221 This underlines that the 
real challenge is not to replace established categories or forms by a case-by-case balancing of welfare-
effects, but to inform these categories with new economic content.222 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have argued that the welfarist approach to EU Competition Law fails to fully explain 
the Court’s reasoning in competition law cases and its reluctance to abandon its form-based approach. 
Based on an analysis of the fundamental ideas and principles of the ordoliberal school of thought in its 
historical context, this paper illustrated in what sense the ordoliberals perceived a direct link between 
competition and democracy. This competition-democracy nexus materializes in the ordoliberal idea of 
competition as institutional legal framework setting limits to private and public economic power in order 
to guarantee freedom, equality of opportunity and welfare. The concept of the competition-democracy 
nexus as the underlying rationale of the said paradigm constitutes a powerful explanation for the 
continuous influence of the ordoliberal school of thought on the Court’s case law. 
Although the Court never explicitly referred to democracy in its case law, its reasoning could be 
explained by an account of competition as a democratic institution. The Court’s approach clearly 
suggests that competition as a specific organizational form of the market economy is not to be protected 
only to the extent that it enhances welfare. On the contrary, the protection of competition for the sake of 
its intrinsic value indicates that the Court also recognizes its social and political importance. However, 
competition is by nature a fragile institution that must be protected against companies with market power 
sufficient to defy or even modify the rules of the game. This may be the rationale under which the Court 
protects the competitive process as relying on and being conducive to a democratic polity.  
Protecting competition as such, besides its welfare maximizing properties, entails certain social costs in 
terms of efficiency.223 This is seen as a ‘perverse’ outcome within a framework that only values 
outcomes in terms of efficiency. 224 Competitive markets like democratic institutions are imperfect; yet 
they are the best tools we have so far for producing the greatest diversity and highest quality of goods 
and services. In this sense, the competitive process has an intrinsic value. From this perspective, the 
ordoliberal paradigm may shed some light on how the Court’s reasoning enhances the input- and output-
oriented legitimacy of the institution of competition. In this respect, certain welfare losses could be 
deemed as the sacrifice for a democratic and pluralistic economic system. 
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